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Abstract—Based on interviews with 28 organizations, we found
that industry practitioners are not equipped with tactical and
strategic tools to protect, detect and respond to attacks on their
Machine Learning (ML) systems. We leverage the insights from
the interviews and enumerate the gaps in securing machine learn-
ing systems when viewed in the context of traditional software
security development. We write this paper from the perspective
of two personas: developers/ML engineers and security incident
responders. The goal of this paper is to layout the research agenda
to amend the Security Development Lifecycle for industrial-grade
software in the adversarial ML era.
Index Terms—adversarial machine learning, software security,
engineering
I. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial Machine Learning is now having a moment in
the software industry - For instance, Google [1], Microsoft [2]
and IBM [3] have signaled, separate from their commitment to
securing their traditional software systems, initiatives to secure
ML systems. In Feb 2019, Gartner, the leading industry market
research firm, published its first report on adversarial machine
learning [4] advising that Application leaders must anticipate
and prepare to mitigate potential risks of data corruption,
model theft, and adversarial samples. The motivation for this
paper is to understand the extent to which organizations across
different industries are protecting their ML systems from
attacks, detecting adversarial manipulation and to responding
to attacks on their ML systems.
There are many reasons why organizations may already
be ahead of the curve in systematically securing their ML
assets. Firstly, in the last three years, companies heavily
investing in machine learning themselves - Google , Amazon ,
Microsoft , Tesla faced some degree of adversarial attacks [5]–
[8]; a bellwether of the rise of adversarial machine learning.
Secondly, standards organizations like ISO [9] are forming
certification rubrics to assess security of ML systems and
whose endorsements have been historically sought after in
the industry [10]. Also, governments are showing signs that
industry will have to build ML systems securely, with the
European Union even releasing a complete checklist to assess
trustworthiness of ML systems [11] Finally, ML is rapidly
becoming core to organizations’ value proposition (with a
projected Annual Growth Rate of 39% for machine learning
investments in 2020 [12]) and it is only natural that organiza-
tions invest in protecting their crown jewels.
We make two contributions in this paper:
1) Despite the compelling reasons to secure ML systems,
over a survey spanning 28 different organizations, we
found that most industry practitioners are yet to come
to terms with adversarial machine learning. 25 out of
the 28 organizations indicated that they dont have the
right tools in place to secure their ML systems and are
explicitly looking for guidance.
2) We enumerate the security engineering aspects of build-
ing ML systems using Security development Lifecycle
(SDL) frame work, the de facto software building pro-
cess in industry.
This paper is a compendium of pain points and gaps in
securing machine learning systems as encountered by typical
software organizations. We hope to appeal to the research
community to help solve the problem faced by two personas
- software developers/ML engineers and security incident
responders - when securing machine learning systems. The
goal of this paper is to engage ML researchers to revise and
amend Security Development Lifecycle for industrial-grade
software in the adversarial ML era.
The paper is organized thus: the first part outlines the survey
methodology and findings. The second part comprises gaps in
securing machine learning in three phases: when ML systems
are designed and developed; when the said system is prepped
for deployment and it is under attack.
II. INDUSTRY SURVEY ABOUT ADVERSARIAL ML
We interviewed 28 organizations spanning Fortune 500,
small-and-medium businesses, non-profits, and government
organizations to understand how they secure their machine
learning systems from adversarial attacks (See Table I and
Table II).
22 out of the 28, were in security sensitive fields such
as finance, consulting, cybersecurity, healthcare, government.
The other 6 organizations represented social media analytics,
publishing, agriculture, urban planning, food processing and
translation services (See Table II for distribution).
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TABLE I
ORGANIZATION SIZE
Organization size Count
Large Organizations (> 1000 employees) 18
Small-and-Medium Size Businesses 10
TABLE II
ORGANIZATION TYPES
Organization Count
Cybersecurity 10
Healthcare 5
Government 4
Consulting 2
Banking 2
Social Media Analytics 1
Publishing 1
Agriculture 1
Urban Planning 1
Food Processing 1
Translation 1
At each organization, we interviewed two personas: the de-
veloper in charge of building machine models in the organiza-
tion, and the security personnel who was on point for securing
the organizations infrastructure. Depending on the size of the
organization, these two personas were either in different teams,
the same team or even the same person. All organizations we
spoke to were familiar with the Security Development Life-
cycle as pertaining to traditional software engineering, though
the degree to which they executed varied larger corporations
that had a more formal, documented process than small and
medium sized corporations. We also limited to organizations
had relatively mature machine learning investments, with a
few of them centering their business around AI.
These organizations executed on their ML strategy in a
variety of ways: most of them used ML toolkits such a
Keras, TensorFlow or PyTorch to build ML models; 10 or-
ganizations relied on Machine Learning as a Service such
as Microsofts Cognitive API [13], Amazon AI Services [14],
Google CloudAI [15]; Only 2 organizations built ML systems
from scratch and not relying on either existing toolkits/ML
platforms (See Table III)
TABLE III
ML STRATEGY
How do you build ML Systems Count
Using ML Frameworks 16
Using ML as a Service 10
Building ML Systems from scratch 2
Limitations of Study: Our sample size of 28 may not
represent the entire population industries employing machine
learning. For instance, the study does not include startups
and has a pre-ponderance of security-sensitive organizations.
We also do not account for geographic distribution most of
the organizations operate and head quartered in the United
States or Europe. We limited ourselves to failures that are
caused by a malicious attacker in the system and did not
investigate broader safety failures such as common corruption
[16], reward hacking [17], distributional shifts [18] or naturally
occurring adversarial examples [19].
A. Findings:
1) Though, all 28 organizations indicated that security of
AI system is important to their business productivity, the
emphasis is still on traditional security. As one security
analyst put it, Our top threat vector is spearphishing
and malware on the box. This [adversarial ML] looks
futuristic. While there is great interest in adversarial
machine learning, only 6 organizations (all of whom are
large organizations or government) are ready to assign
head-count to solve the problem
2) Lack of adversarial ML know-how: Organizations seem
lack the tactical knowledge to secure machine learning
systems in production. As one of them put it, Traditional
software attacks are a known unknown. Attacks on our
ML models are unknown unknown. 22 out of the 25 (3
government organizations abstained from answering this
question satisfactorily) organizations said that they dont
have the right tools in place to secure their ML systems
and are explicitly looking for guidance. Also, security
engineers mostly do not have the ability to detect and
respond to attacks on ML systems (See Table IV)
TABLE IV
STATE OF ADVERSARIAL ML
Do you secure your ML systems today Count
Yes 3
No 22
3) We walked through the list of attacks as outlined in [20]
and asked them to pick the top attack that would affect
their businesses(See Table V). Note: respondents were
allowed to pick only one threat as opposed to stack rank
them all. The result were as follows:
TABLE V
TOP ATTACK
Which attack would affect your org the most? Distribution
Poisoning (e.g: [21]) 10
Model Stealing (e.g: [22]) 6
Model Inversion (e.g: [23]) 4
Backdoored ML (e.g: [24]) 4
Membership Inference (e.g: [25]) 3
Adversarial Examples (e.g: [26]) 2
Reprogramming ML System (e.g: [27]) 0
Adversarial Example in Physical Domain (e.g: [5]) 0
Malicious ML provider recovering training data (e.g: [28]) 0
Attacking the ML supply chain (e.g: [24]) 0
Exploit Software Dependencies (e.g: [29]) 0
• Data poisoning has caught the attention of enter-
prises, perhaps because of the cultural significance
of Tay. A medium sized financial tech put it thus,
We use ML systems to suggest tips and financial
products for our users. The integrity of our ML
system matters a lot. Worried about inappropriate
recommendation like attack on Tay
• Organizations care most about attacks that can lead
to potential breach of privacy. As one of the banks
put it, Want to protect client info, employee info
used in ML models but we dont know have a plan
in place
• Model Stealing that can lead to loss of Intellectual
property is another concern. A large retail organiza-
tion said, We run a proprietary algorithm to solve
our problem and it would be worrisome if someone
can reverse engineer it
• Adversarial Examples in the physical domain, res-
onated with the respondents, but did not rank high
on the list. One reason may be that the organizations
we spoke to did not have physical component like
cars or drones.
4) For security analysts, there is a mismatch between ex-
pectations and reality when it comes to adversarial ML.
Many security analysts expect that algorithms available
in platforms such as Keras, TensorFlow or PyTorch
are inherently secure against adversarial manipulations
and have already been battle tested against adversarial
ML attacks. This is perhaps, because security analysts
who have mostly been exposed to traditional software,
assume that libraries put out by large organizations
such as Facebook or Google would have been already
been security stress tested. Similarly, organizations seem
to push the security responsibility upstream to service
providers as one of the respondents said, We use Ma-
chine Learning as a Service and expect them to provide
these robust algorithms and platforms
5) Finally, security analysts and developers do not know
what to expect when systems get attacked. As one of
the ML engineers put it, I dont expect any system to be
immune from spoofing, but I need to know confidence
levels and expected performance; as well as potential
failure modes. If system is spoofed, what is the worst
possible outcome?
In the following sections of the paper, summarized in Fig.1
, we elaborate the gaps in current SDL process when building
ML systems, as they are prepped for deployment and when the
ML system is under attack. For each gap, we outline existing
methods in traditional software development and sketch future
research agenda.
III. ABOUT SDL
In July 2001, Microsoft was affected by CodeRed, a com-
puter worm that affected Internet Information Server (IIS) 4.0
and 5.0 [30]. This happened because of a single line error in
code running by default in IIS4 and IIS5 systems, enabling a
buffer overflow attack. In Jan 2002, Microsoft halted develop-
ing any new software for 2 months to fix all known security
bugs in its system, pairing security experts with developers.
Out of this close interaction, a systematic process of providing
security guidance evolved, helping engineers look for software
defects and implementation flaws. This set of practices has
now come to be called the Secure Development Lifecycle
(SDL). While SDL does not eliminate all software bugs, they
do help to catch software vulnerabilities that could later be
exploited, before it reaches the hands of a customer. For
instance, after SDL was introduced in Microsoft, the number
of reported vulnerabilities between Windows XP and Windows
Vista, reduced by 45%, and number of vulnerabilities between
SQL Server 2000 and SQL Server 2005, reduced by 91% [31].
Currently SDL, in some form, is a de-facto process in industry-
grade software development adopted by 122 organizations
[32], including Google [33], IBM [34], Facebook [35] and
Netflix [36].
The primary inquiry is amending and revising the SDL
process used in securing traditional software, to secure ML
systems against adversarial attacks.
IV. GAPS DURING DEVELOPMENT OF ML SOLUTION
A. Curated repository of attacks
In traditional software security, attacks are decomposed
into shareable tactics and procedures and are collectively
organized in the MITRE ATT&CK framework [37]. This
provides a search-able attack repository comprising, attacks
by researchers as well as nation state attackers. For every
attack, there is a description of the technique, which advanced
persistent threat is known to use it, detection ideas as well as
reference to publications with further context.
In adversarial ML, the scholarship is booming [38] but the
awareness is low among developers and security analysts only
5 out of 28 organizations stated that they had working knowl-
edge of adversarial ML. We propose that a similar curated
repository of attacks be created, preferably by extending the
widely used existing MITRE Framework. For instance, when
adversarial ML researchers publish a new type of attack, we
ask them to register their attacks in the MITRE framework,
so that security analysts have a unified view of traditional and
adversarial ML attacks.
B. Adversarial ML specific secure coding practices:
In traditional software setting, secure coding practice en-
ables engineers to reduce exploitable vulnerabilities in their
programs and enables auditing of source code by other en-
gineers. For instance Python [39], Java, C and C++ [40]
have well defined secure coding practice against traditional
software bugs like memory corruption. In machine learning
setting, adversarial ML specific security guidance is sparse.
Most toolkits provide best practices (TensorFlow [41] , Pytorch
[42], Keras [43]) but TensorFlow is the only framework that
provides consolidated guidance around traditional software
attacks [44] and links to tools for testing against adversarial
attacks [45].
We think future work in adversarial ML should focus
on providing best practices to eliminate undefined program
Fig. 1. Security Engineering aspects of Machine Learning
behaviors and exploitable vulnerabilities. We acknowledge it
is difficult to provide concrete guidance because the field is
protean [46]. Perhaps one direction, would be to enumer-
ate guidance based on security consequence. Viewing the
world through SDL allows for imperfect solutions to exist.
For instance, in traditional software security, the outdated
cryptgenradnom [47] function should not be used to generate
random seeds for secret sharing protocols which are of higher
security consequence), but can be used to generate process
IDs in an operating system (which is of lower security
consequence). Instead of thinking of secure coding practice as
underwriting a strong security guarantee, a good start would be
to provide examples of security-compliant and non-compliant
code examples.
C. Static Analysis and Dynamic Analysis of ML Systems
In traditional software security, static analysis tools help
detect potential bugs in the code without the need for execution
and to detect violations in coding practices. The source code
is generally converted into an abstract syntax tree, which is
then used to create a control flow graph. Coding practices
and checks, which are turned into logic, are searched over the
control flow graph, and are raised as errors when inconsitent
with logic. In traditional software for instance, in Python tools
like Pyt [48] detect traditional software security vulnerabilities.
Dynamic analysis, on the other hand, involves searching for
vulnerabilities on executing a certain code path.
On the ML front, tools like cleverhans [45], secml [49],
and the adversarial robustness toolkit [50] providing a certain
degree of white-box style and blackbox style dynamic testing.
A future area of research is how to extend the analysis to
model stealing, model inversion and membership inference
style attacks. Out of the box static analysis for adversarial
ML is less explored. One promising angle is work like
Code2graph [51] that generates call graphs in ML platform
and in conjunction with symbolic execution may provide the
first step towards a static analysis tool. We hope that the static
analysis tools ultimately integrate with IDE (integrated de-
velopment environment) to provide analytical insight into the
syntax, semantics, so as to prevent the introduction of security
vulnerabilities before the application code is committed to the
code repository.
D. Auditing and Logging in ML Systems
To use a traditional software example, important security
events in the operating system like process creation are logged
in the host, which is then forwarded to Security Information
and Event Management (SIEM) systems. This later enables,
security responders to run anomaly detection [52], [53] to
detect if an anomalous process (which is an indication of
malware) was executed on the machine.
Auditing in ML systems was initially pointed by Papernot
[54] with solution sketches to instrument ML environments
to capture telemetry. As done in traditional software security,
we recommend that developers of ML systems, identify high
impact activities in their system. We recommend executing the
list of attacks that are considered harmful to the organization
and ensuring that the events manifesting in the telemetry
can be traced back to the attack. Finally, these events must
be exportable to traditional Security Information and Event
Management systems, so that analysts can keep an audit trail
for future investigations.
E. Detection and Monitoring of ML systems
Currently, ML environments are illegible to security analysts
as they have no operational insights. There has been insightful
working pointing to the brittleness of current adversarial de-
tection mechanisms [46] and how to make them better [19]. In
addition, we propose that detection methods are written so that
they are easily shared among security analysts. For instance,
in traditional software security, detection logic is written in
a common format, the most popular of which is Sigma [55].
Where MITRE ATT&CK provides a great repository of insight
in techniques used by adversaries, Sigma can turn one analyst’s
insights into defensive action for many, by providing a way
to self-documented concrete logic for detecting an attacker’s
techniques.
V. GAPS WHEN PREPARING FOR DEPLOYMENT OF ML
SYSTEM
A. Automating Tools in Deployment Pipeline
In a typical traditional software setting, after a developer
as the developer completes small chunks of the assigned
task, the following sequence of steps generally follow: first,
the code is committed to source control and Continuous
Integration triggers application build and unit tests; once these
are passed, Continuous Deployment triggers an automated
deployment into testing and then production wherein it reaches
the customer. At each step of the build, security tools are
integrated.
We hope that dynamic analysis tools built for adversarial
ML are integrated into the continuous integration / continuous
delivery pipeline. Automating the adversarial ML testing,
will help fix issues and without overloading engineers with
too many tools or alien processes outside of their everyday
engineering experience.
B. Red Teaming ML Systems
Informally, the risk of an attack to an organization depends
on two factors: the impact it has on the business and the
likelihood of the attack occurring. Threat modeling of ML
Systems [56], performed by the ML developers, address the
impact factor. Red teaming, the deliberate process of exploiting
the system through any means possible conducted by an inde-
pendent security team, helps to assess the likelihood factor. For
critical security applications, red teaming is industry standard
and a requirement for providing software to US governments
[57]. With Facebook being the first industry to start an AI Red
Team [58] and is unexplored area in the adversarial ML field
for others.
C. Transparency Centers
In traditional security, large organizations such as Kaspersky
[59], Huawei [60] have provided transparency centers where
participants visit a secure facility to conduct deep levels
of source code inspection and analysis. Participants would
have access to source code and an environment for in-depth
inspection with diagnostic tools to verify the security aspects
of different products such as SSL and TCP/IP implementation
or pseudorandom number generators.
In adversarial ML context, future transparency centers may
need to attest over 3 modalities: that the ML platform is
implemented in a secure fashion; that the MLaaS is imple-
mented meeting basic security objectives and finally, that the
ML model embedded in an edge device (such as models on
mobile phones, for instance) meets basic security objectives.
An interesting direction for future research is to providing
tools/test harnesses to advance security assurance of products
building on top of formal verification such as [61], [62] to
extend to large scale ML models used in industry.
VI. GAPS WHEN AN ML SYSTEM IS UNDER ATTACK
A. Tracking and Scoring ML Vulnerabilities
In traditional software security, when a researcher finds a
vulnerability in a system, it is first assigned a unique identi-
fication number and registered in a database called Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposure [63]. Accompanying these vul-
nerabilities are severity ratings calculated by using Common
Vulnerability Scoring System [64]. For instance, in the recent
zero day found against Internet Explorer that allowed for
remote code execution [65] the vulnerability was referred to
as ”CVE-2020-0674” and had assigned a base CVSS score 7.5
out of 10 [66], roughly indicating the seriousness of the bug.
This enables the entire industry to refer to the problem using
the same tongue.
In an ML context, we ask the adversarial ML research com-
munity to register vulnerabilities (especially affecting large
groups of consumers) in a trackable system like CVE to ensure
that industry manufacturers are alerted. It is not clear how
ML vulnerabilities should be scored accounting for risk and
impact. Finally, When a security analyst sees news about an
attack, the bottom line is mostly Is my organization affected
by the attack? and today, organizations lack the ability to
scan an ML environment for known adversarial ML specific
vulnerabilities.
B. Incident Response
When a security engineer receives a notification that an ML
system is under attack, and triages that the attack is relevant
to the business, there are two important steps ascertaining
blast radius and preparing for containment. For instance, in
the case of ransomware, a traditional software attack, the blast
radius would be to determine other machines connected to the
infected machine, and containment would be to remove the
machines from the network for forensic analysis.
Both steps are difficult, because ML systems are highly
integrated in a production setting where a failure of one can
lead to unintended consequences [67]. One interesting line of
research is to identify whether, if it is possible to container-ize
ML systems so as to quarantine uncompromised ML systems
from the impact of a compromised ML system, just as anti
virus systems would quarantine an infected file.
C. Forensics
In traditional software security, once the machine is con-
tained, it is prepared for forensics to ascertain root cause.
There are a lot of open questions in this area so as to
meaningfully interrogate ML systems under attack to ascertain
the root cause of failure:
1) What are the artifacts that should be analyzed for every
ML attack? Model file? The queries that were scored?
Training data? Architecture? Telemetry? Hardware? All
the software applications running on the attacked sys-
tem? How can we leverage work data provenance and
model provenance for forensics?
2) How should these artifacts be collected? For instance, for
ML models developed on the end point or Internet of
Things vs. organizations using ML as a Service, the arti-
facts available for analysis and acquisition methodology
will be different. We posit that ML forensics method-
ology is dependent on ML frameworks (like PyTorch
vs. TensorFlow), ML paradigms (e.g: reinforcement
learning vs. supervised learning) and ML environment
(running on host vs cloud vs edge).
3) An orthogonal step that may be carried out is cyberthreat
attribution, wherein the security analyst is able to deter-
mine the actor responsible for the attack. In traditional
software, this is done by analyzing the forensic evidence
such as infrastructure used to mount the attack, threat
intelligence and ascertaining the attackers tools, tactics
and procedures using established rubrics called analytic
trade craft [68]. It is unclear how this would be amended
in the adversarial ML age.
D. Remediation
In traditional software security. Tuesday is often synony-
mous with Patch Tuesday. This is when companies like
Microsoft, SAS, and Adobe release patches for vulnerabili-
ties in their software, which are then installed based on an
organization’s patching policy.
In an ML context, when Tay was compromised because of
poisoning attack, it was suspended by Microsoft. This may
not be possible for all ML systems, especially those that have
been deployed on the edge. It is not clear what the guidelines
are for patching a system, that is vulnerable to model . On the
same lines, it is not clear how one would validate if the patched
ML model will perform as well as the previous one, but not
be subject to the same vulnerabilities based on Papernot et.
als [69] transferability result.
VII. CONCLUSION
In a keynote in 2019, Nicholas Carlini [70] likened the
adversarial ML field to crypto pre-Shannon based on the ease
with which defenses are broken. We extend Carlinis metaphor
beyond just attacks and defenses: through interviews spanning
28 organizations, we found that most ML engineers and inci-
dent responders are unequipped to secure industry-grade ML
systems against adversarial attacks. We also enumerate how
researchers can contribute to Security Development Lifecyle
(SDL), the de facto process for building reliable software, in
the era of adversarial ML. We conclude that if ML is Software
2.0 [71], it also needs to follow fundamental security rigor
from traditional software 1.0 development process.
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